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James Shires
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ABSTRACT
Cybersecurity experts foster a perception of cybersecurity as a gloomy underworld
in which the good guys must resort to unconventional tactics to keep at bay a
motley group of threats to the digital safety of unsuspecting individuals,
businesses, and governments. This article takes this framing seriously, drawing
on ﬁlm studies scholarship that identiﬁes certain aesthetic themes as associated
with moral ambiguity in noir ﬁlms. This article introduces the term “cyber-noir”
to describe the incorporation of noir elements in cybersecurity expert
discourses. It argues that the concept of cyber-noir helps explain the persistence
of practices that blur legal, moral, and professional lines between legitimate and
malicious activity in cyberspace. Consequently, changing cybersecurity requires
not only institutional and technological measures, but also a re-constitution of
cybersecurity identities themselves.
KEYWORDS Cybersecurity; popular culture; ﬁlm; threat intelligence; noir; narrative
Dark Trace. Digital Shadows. Dark Cubed. Carbon Black. Dark Matter. Many
emerging companies in the cybersecurity industry deliberately play on the
popular perception of cybersecurity as a nether region, a gloomy underworld
in which the good guys must resort to unconventional tactics to keep at bay
a motley group of threats to the digital safety of unsuspecting individuals,
businesses, and governments. These purveyors of what might be called
“cyber-noir”–deﬁned as the incorporation of noir aesthetics and themes into
expert cybersecurity discourses–are often dismissed in International Relations
(IR) as a mere sideshow, a footnote to more comfortable state-based dynamics.
This article does the opposite. It takes the branding of the cybersecurity industry
seriously, asking why these companies seek to portray liminality, transgression,
and tantalizing opacity. Is it, as a (relatively) viral video of Michael Sulmeyer,
former Director of Harvard Kennedy School’s Cybersecurity Project, put it,
just an eﬀort to conjure up “cybersecurity sex appeal” (Sulmeyer, 2016)? Or
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is there something else going on–something more fundamental to cybersecurity
itself, and more theoretically interesting?
This article puts forward the concept of cyber-noir to capture the inter-
action between two discourses: an expert discourse of cybersecurity and a
wider noir discourse circulating primarily in popular culture artefacts such
as ﬁlms, books, and television series. It approaches this interaction from a
post-structural perspective, understanding discourses not as collections of
texts produced by already ﬁxed actors, but as deﬁning and constraining the
identities of those actors, and through discursive overlaps and tensions gen-
erating meaning and providing conditions of possibility for action. Unlike
other post-structuralist works in security studies, which often prioritize read-
ings of popular culture artefacts as political texts, this article instead focuses
on the appearance of popular culture elements in speciﬁc expert practices.
It argues that the concept of cyber-noir helps explain the persistence of
expert practices that blur legal, moral, and professional lines between legiti-
mate and malicious activity in cyberspace.
The article is structured in four sections. The ﬁrst section argues that distinct
cybersecurities noted by securitization scholars share a common distinction
between legitimate and malicious activity, and that cybersecurity experts
work to maintain this distinction against technological, economic, and social
factors that threaten to undermine it. The second section provides the theoreti-
cal basis for the concept of cyber-noir, drawing on ﬁlm studies, critical security
studies, and wider postmodern thought, including that of Baudrillard, to justify
the article’s focus on popular culture inﬂuences on cybersecurity such as noir,
science ﬁction, and cyber-punk. The third and fourth sections analyze two
aspects of cybersecurity expert discourses: visual styles and naming conven-
tions. These sections trace noir inﬂuences on images and names circulating
in these discourses, arguing that these inﬂuences create and sustain a morally
ambiguous expert identity, which in turn perpetuates practices that blur the
legitimate/malicious boundary. To paraphrase a neat description of ﬁlm noir
leads, cybersecurity experts see themselves as “seeming black and then
seeming white, and being both all along” (Luhr, 2012, p. 32). Consequently,
the deepest diﬃculty in maintaining the legitimate/malicious binary–and there-
fore constructing a stable foundation for cybersecurity itself–is not the range of
technological, social, and economic pressures explicitly recognized by cyberse-
curity experts, but their implicit embrace of cyber-noir.
Legitimate and malicious activity in cyberspace
This section locates the article in existing cybersecurity theory in International
Relations (IR) scholarship. It argues that a foundational problem in cyberse-
curity is the task of drawing a clear dividing line between legitimate and mal-
icious activity in an environment swamped with data, where identical tools
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and tactics are used for diﬀerent ends, and where social and economic struc-
tures compound technical similarities.
Hansen and Nissenbaum (2009) have argued inﬂuentially that cybersecur-
ity, as an emerging discourse in international security, is the product of a tech-
nical computer security discourse plus securitization: the framing of
international political issues as problems of security (Buzan, Waever, &
Wilde, 1997). A large literature has critically examined the securitization of
cyberspace (e.g., Barnard-Wills & Ashenden, 2012; Bendrath, 2001; Lee &
Rid, 2014; Zajko, 2015), highlighting that cybersecurity threats are the contin-
gent result of particular communications to a receptive audience. As Dunn
Cavelty has shown, this securitization is not dependent on a single speech
act, but has a complex genealogy (2008a, 2008b), and relies on less visible
actors to shape threat perceptions (2013). The most exaggerated cybersecurity
threats, termed “cyber-doom” by Lawson (2013), are apocalyptic scenarios of
state collapse, widespread injury, and death. Although the state unsurprisingly
dominates IR literature as the main “referent object” for cyber-securitizations,
other referent objects do exist. Liberal personhood, digital systems, and proﬁt-
oriented organizations have all been proposed as alternatives (Deibert, 2018;
Flyverbom, Deibert, & Matten, 2017; Shires, 2019). Overall, this literature
demonstrates that cybersecurity consists of multiple overlapping, sometimes
contradictory, and sometimes failed security discourses.
A common thread running through these diverse cybersecurity discourses
is a binary distinction between the terms “legitimate” and “malicious,” in
descriptions of speciﬁc digital communications, wider patterns of activity,
and attached to individuals, organizations, and states. This binary distinction
stems from the original technical discourse of computer security, focused on
the maintenance of formal deﬁnitions of conﬁdentiality, availability, and
integrity of communications channels against well-speciﬁed adversary capa-
bilities. The distinction can be found throughout the diﬀerent cyber-securiti-
zations above, incorporating a range of referent objects. This “intentional
ambiguity” has problematic consequences, as it represents both a point of
contact and site of contest between diﬀerent cybersecurity discourses
(Shires, in press). Nonetheless, the existence of a focal point at which
diﬀerent securitizations converge enables the treatment of varied cybersecur-
ity discourses together, as centered on a distinction between legitimate and
malicious cyber activity. Moreover, one of the main tasks of cybersecurity
experts is to continually re-draw this line: deﬁning what is within and
outside the sphere of legitimate activity, and thereby repeatedly re-aﬃrming
the distinction itself. Cybersecurity experts explicitly conduct this deﬁnitional
work against three kinds of countervailing pressures.
First, they see the technological characteristics of cyberspace as an obstacle
to the legitimate/malicious distinction. Because cyber-attacks exploit logical
ﬂaws in digital systems, intruders seek to mimic legitimate activity as
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closely as possible: in the oft-quoted words of Libicki (2010), “there is no
forced entry in cyberspace.” For example, while “legitimate” users enter a
string of text in a website password ﬁeld, “malicious” actors insert executable
code that extracts information from the underlying database; but the execu-
table code is still text, just with diﬀerent characters. More generally, many
computer viruses are downloaded from what appear to be “legitimate”
emails or websites. These viruses locate themselves in standard system pro-
cesses, obfuscating their “malicious” components and creatively manipulating
“legitimate” routes to receive commands and exﬁltrate data. Often, “mali-
cious” actors simply repurpose “legitimate” tools and programs, like remote
shells or data deletion software (Bronk & Tikk-Ringas, 2013). In addition,
the sheer volume of information passing through digital networks means
that cybersecurity defenses must make a trade-oﬀ between allowing “legiti-
mate” communications while simultaneously preventing “malicious” ones;
however, at such scales even a small margin of error means that the two
are often confused. Finally, Gartzke and Lindsay (2015) highlight the preva-
lence of deception on both sides, because while attacks imitate benign com-
munications to gain entry and avoid detection, defenders also exploit
technical characteristics of cyberspace to set up realistic digital “honeypots,”
luring attackers into believing they are entering genuine systems.
Second, cybersecurity experts also view themselves as maintaining the
legitimate/malicious distinction against contrary economic and institutional
dynamics. Factors include: institutional structures placing oﬀensive and
defensive actors in the same organization, such as government intelligence
agencies, and sometimes in the same room (Kaplan, 2017); a lack of regulatory
and legal frameworks preventing private companies from “hacking back”
against attackers to prevent further economic loss (Kello, 2019); and low-
risk high-reward dynamics enticing individuals to sell vulnerabilities and
exploits on black and grey markets (Fidler, 2015). Although these practices
all blur the line between legitimate and malicious activity, the economic
and social structures most frequently cited in this vein are penetration or
“pen” testing and bug bounty programs, where either speciﬁc companies
are paid to simulate a cyberattack on a system, or an open call is made to
any cybersecurity researcher to do the same for ﬁnancial reward depending
on the scale of the vulnerability found (Ellis, Huang, Siegel, Moussouris, &
Houghton, 2018). The prevalence of pen testing and bug bounties means
that many “malicious” tools can be developed and acquired legally, with the
justiﬁcation that they are designed only for carefully limited uses.
A third obstacle locates diﬃculties in the constitution of the ﬁeld itself,
pointing to the contradictory ideas of security in cybersecurity discourses
explored above. Cybersecurity experts identify two kinds of diﬃculties in
maintaining the legitimate/malicious distinction in relation to diﬀerent refer-
ent objects. The ﬁrst concerns diﬀerent referent objects of the same kind with
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competing self/other representations. For example, for the United States, its
own oﬀensive cyber activity is “legitimate” national security espionage while
similar Chinese activity is nearly always “malicious” intellectual property
theft (Paletta, 2015). More complicated contradictions emerge between
diﬀerent categories of referent object. Following wider debates in security
studies between national and human security (Paris, 2001), these two
cyber-securitizations lead to opposite deﬁnitions of legitimate and malicious
activity. “Legitimate” state surveillance of cyber threats, in the former,
becomes itself a “malicious” cyber threat to individuals in the latter, while
“legitimate” freedom of expression from an individual perspective becomes
a “malicious” cyber threat to state information control (Deibert, Palfrey,
Rohozinski, & Zittrain, 2011; Shires, 2019).
These explicit obstacles to the distinction between legitimate and malicious
cyber activity are well recognized in the cybersecurity literature, and I do not
mean to diminish their importance in this article. Instead, I want to highlight
another factor that is implicit but no less important. To preview the argument
below, I suggest that the diﬃculty of distinguishing legitimate and malicious
activity is also a result of popular cultural inﬂuences on expert cybersecurity
discourses. These inﬂuences produce cybersecurity identities that are liminal
and transgressive, moving ﬂuidly between “legitimate” and “malicious” prac-
tices. To appreciate such popular cultural inﬂuences, we need to move from
the constructivist basis of securitization theory towards post-structural the-
ories of discursive constitution and interaction. As Guzzini (2000) has
argued, the two theoretical approaches are not necessarily opposed, as long
as the critical origins of securitization theory are emphasized (Barkin &
Sjoberg, 2019). Without space to enter further into this debate here, I
merely wish to note that some strands of securitization theory, such as the
“Paris” school focusing on the security practices of “professional managers
of unease” (Bigo, 2002, p. 74), have strong aﬃnities with my focus on
experts (Balzacq, 2010; Bigo, 2008; for further developments Van Rythoven,
2015). I use the term “discourses” as well as “practices” in this article, recog-
nizing that this conceptual relationship is complex and practices are not “oﬀ-
limits” to post-structural theorists (Adler & Pouliot, 2011; Hansen, 2006) The
upshot is that this article does not analyze key moments of securitization, such
as securitizing speech acts, their venue, or audience, instead focusing on more
“everyday” popular cultural elements of expert discourses.
This argument is relevant to IR scholars outside cybersecurity, ﬁtting into a
broader literature on popular culture and international politics. It follows
Weldes’ call to “go cultural” in the study of IR, with the rationale that “[pol-
itical] representations are themselves made sensible in no small part precisely
because they ﬁt with, or articulate to, the constructions of the world and its
workings into which diverse publics are hailed in their everyday lives”
(1999, p. 133). These scholars use diverse theoretical approaches including
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securitization theory (Vuori, 2010; Williams, 2003), poststructuralism
(Campbell, 2003; Derian, 2005), and sociological theories of risk (Amoore,
2007) to shed new light on familiar security subjects such as war, terrorism,
border control, and nuclear proliferation. More recent work has taken this
inspiration in a range of fascinating directions (Jones & Paris, 2018; Kiersey
& Neumann, 2013; Musgrave, 2019; Neumann & Nexon, 2006; Young & Car-
penter, 2018) For these scholars, popular culture artefacts are not merely
ephemera of state-based dynamics but both an expression of and inﬂuence
on policymakers’ and citizens’ identities, attitudes, and desires.
Many of the studies above prioritize readings of popular culture artefacts as
political texts over reading politics in the categories of popular culture. Partly
this is due to a choice of empirical data, as these scholars conduct their
research mainly through careful watching of speciﬁc ﬁlms or television
series (for an explicit reﬂection on this research design, see Shepherd, 2012,
p. 2). But this emphasis is also due to the type of questions they ask.
Weber’s analysis of select post-9/11 U.S. movies focuses on the “moral gram-
mars” (Weber, 2005, pp. 10–12) articulated by these ﬁlms that then percolate
into citizens’ “imaginary” of the place of America in the world. Similarly,
Shapiro (2008) explores the “violent cartographies” expressed in modern
U.S. cinema. Macleod (2014) turns the circle even further, innovatively
reading two Swedish and Italian “noir police procedural” novel series
known by their eponymous detectives, Wallander and Montalbano, as a
new paradigm for critical security scholarship itself. In contrast, this article
follows those works that focus more on tracing popular culture references,
styles and themes in political practices. Prince (2009, pp. 74–79) argues that
the 9/11 attacks were framed through the prism of earlier dramas featuring
burning tower blocks going back to the 1930s, as well as having a clear
impact on later ﬁlms. Stimmer (2019) shows how the term “Star Wars” for
Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) shaped advocacy and acceptance
of the policy itself (as a former actor, Reagan was an avid consumer of
ﬁlm). The ﬁrst step in following this research direction is to introduce the rel-
evant popular cultural components: namely, noir and its infusion with science
ﬁction, cyber-punk and other genres.
Noir and cybersecurity
“Noir” is a term applied to several mediums of entertainment and popular
culture including ﬁlms, books, television series and comics. The term itself
is often traced to the series noire on television in interwar France (Porﬁrio,
1976, p. 4), while inﬂuences on noir include detective novels like Agatha
Christie’s Poirot and Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes, the “hardboiled”
style of U.S. writers such as Dashiell Hammett and Raymond Chandler, and
the “police procedural” genre. The most prevalent use of noir is in the term
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ﬁlm noir, coined by French critic Nino Frank in 1946, who used “ﬁlms noirs”
to describe a speciﬁc set of U.S.-made ﬁlms that travelled to France after the
end of WorldWar II (Frank, 1996, p. 21). These ﬁlms tested the boundaries of
Hollywood censors at the time due to their sexual and violent content and
“immoral” subjects and messages (Borde & Chaumeton, 1996; Spicer,
2007). The original ﬁlms noirs were followed by a revival in the 1970s com-
monly termed “neo-noir”, which either updated noir characteristics to that
time or set their story in the original noir era (Erickson, 1996).
Film scholarship contains signiﬁcant disagreements about the deﬁnition of
noir. Its overall status as a genre is often questioned, and noir is often
described instead as a style, tone or mood (Palmer, 1996, pp. 14–17). Some
analyses focus on formal and content characteristics (chiaroscuro eﬀects, voi-
ceovers, retrospective narratives, casting types), and view various directors’
idiolects as part of the noir movement (Porﬁrio, 2013). Other scholars
divide deﬁnitional strategies for ﬁlm noir into semantic approaches, which
catalogue core elements, and syntactic approaches, which trace relationships
between ﬁlms (Bould, 2005, p. 6). The relationship between popular concepts
of noir and the noir canon is complicated: for example, despite the close
mixing of popular and classical musical styles in early noir, cool jazz is now
a signiﬁer of noir itself (Ness, 2008, p. 69). Overall, Naremore (2008,
p. 254) argues for conceptualizing noir as a discourse rather than a genre.
In his words:
[noir] belongs to the history of ideas as much as to the history of cinema… it
has less to do with a group of artefacts as with a discourse – a loose evolving
system of arguments and readings that help to shape commercial strategies
and aesthetic ideologies. (p.11)
Importantly, noir has unconventional moral features. As Naremore (2013)
notes, noir is unusual because of “its anti-utopian qualities… ; its disorienting
narratives; its mesmerizing play of style; and its complex treatment of gender,
sexuality, and race.” Walker-Morrison (2018, pp. 4–5) lists ﬁve key noir
themes: crime, greed and eroticism; a somber tone; pessimism, fatalism and
angst; moral ambiguity; and an absence of positive closure. Consequently,
unlike the television series examined by Shepherd (2012, p. 4) that provide
“order, metaphysical signiﬁcance, and certainty” to their viewers, noir narra-
tives do not have simple divisions between “good guys” and “bad guys” or a
clear moral message concerning their dark subjects of crime, violence, and
angst. The overall narrative arc is not one of restoring order, but is instead
a constant chaotic, violent and unfair world. It should be noted that some
scholars argue that noir amorality only occurs in context of the failed projects
that are socially unacceptable (Palmer, 1996, p. 12); consequently, their failure
itself suggests that “conventional” morality remains the standard by which
these characters are judged. Others highlight the refuges and small
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moments of hope in noir ﬁlms, especially optimistic relationships of trust
despite evidence to the contrary (Hallberg, 2015). Nonetheless–and crucially
for my purposes–the aesthetics and moral tone of noir are intimately linked: a
darkened, somber aesthetic reinforces the moral ambiguity of noir characters.
I will return to this association in the following sections when analyzing
cybersecurity expert practices.
As indicated in the previous section, the integration of noir elements into
cybersecurity, as an interaction between two discourses, calls for a post-struc-
tural analysis. Post-structuralism holds that discourses are ﬂuid and histori-
cally contingent systems of signiﬁcation (Hansen, 2006; Milliken, 1999). As
Hansen (2006, pp. 19–28) outlines, this means that discourses are constitutive
of reality, so there is no extra-discursive facts to which discursive represen-
tations can be compared, and are plural, so there are multiple discourses in
any area of analysis, with the focus and limits partly decided by the observer
with their own interests and strategies. Consequently, a useful way of under-
standing relationships within and between discourses is through the concept
of “intertextuality”: the appearance of elements of one text in another, and
more widely the myriad intricate relationships between diﬀerent texts
(Derian & Shapiro, 1989). If both popular culture artefacts and political rep-
resentations are texts (in the broadest possible sense of the term as something
with meaning), then intertextuality highlights the two-way relationship
between them. Political characters, stories and tropes are recognizable in
popular culture, and vice versa.
The starting point for understanding noir inﬂuences in cybersecurity
expert discourses is the relationship of noir to other areas of popular
culture, especially science ﬁction. Cybersecurity, unsurprisingly, has many
science ﬁction elements and prominent early descriptions of cyberspace
resembled or were science ﬁction, such as Neuromancer (Barlow, 1996;
Gibson, 2003). Other science ﬁction ﬁlms, especially 1983’s War Games,
were key inﬂuences on U.S. policy, including in the creation of the U.S. Com-
puter Fraud and Abuse Act (Kaplan, 2017). Noir has entwined repeatedly with
science ﬁction in cinema, especially through adaptions of the stories of Philip
K. Dick. These include Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1989), which was based
on the short story “Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?,” mixing mid-
twentieth century aesthetics with artiﬁcial intelligence and humanoid “repli-
cants”, as well as Total Recall andMinority Report. For Zizek, in a piece exam-
ining the epistemological anxieties of noir protagonists, noir “realizes its
notion only by way of its fusion with another genre, speciﬁcally science
ﬁction or the occult” (Zizek, 1993, p. 200). A signiﬁcant dystopian strand of
science ﬁction–often labelled “cyber-punk”–is thus not easily distinguishable
from noir, and Luhr (2012) has gone as far to label the Terminator ﬁlms and
Minority Report as “tech noir”(p.47). Other notable fusions include The
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Matrix trilogy and Ghost in the Shell, while more recent television series such
as Mr. Robot and Black Mirror continue this trend.
The ﬁgure of the hacker illustrates how this intersection between science
ﬁction and noir includes both aesthetic and moral elements. The concept of
a hacker is foundational in cybersecurity, stretching beyond lone or socially
marginalized individuals with unusual skills. Nissenbaum argues that legisla-
tive bodies and media have inverted a valorized view of creative individuals
who sought ways around the technical constraints of the early architecture
of the internet, with hackers instead becoming outlawed as “terrorists of the
Information Age” (Nissenbaum, 2004). Other authors show how such percep-
tions incorrectly homogenize hacker communities (Coleman, 2014; Coleman &
Golub, 2008), especially through gender stereotypes (Tanczer, 2015). Popular
culture is a crucial aspect of this representation. The hacker stereotype itself
originates in several strands of popular culture (Wall, 2008), while some
hacker groups have adopted sophisticated media practices (Kubitschko,
2015). Overall, a dominant association with transgression and danger makes
hacker images a rich repository for noir inﬂuences, despite the “diverse reper-
toire of moral genres” potentially available in “hacker morality” (Coleman &
Golub, 2008, p. 271). I return to such images in the following section.
Another relevant perspective on the joint inﬂuence of noir and science
ﬁction on politics is oﬀered by cultural theorist Baudrillard, whose writings
reference many of the works above, and include a sustained analysis of the
dystopian Crash, the novel by J.G. Ballard and ﬁlm by David Cronenberg.
Claims that mass media have created an environment where events are
mediated and re-presented to such an extent that one can no longer sensibly
speak of a real event or model to which the representations refer; this is the
meaning of his famous formulation that the Gulf War “did not take place”
(Baudrillard, 1995). We exist instead in the “hyperreal,” where the distinction
between simulation and reality has collapsed, and signiﬁcation does not
require a pretense to origin and authenticity (Baudrillard, 1994). Baudrillard
was himself an inﬂuence on the works above; for example, The Matrix
includes a shot of a hollowed-out copy of Baudrillard’s Simulacra and Simu-
lation. As McQueen recounts in his analysis of Baudrillard’s relationship to
the cyber-punk movement, Baudrillard’s sneering response was that “The
Matrix is the kind of ﬁlm about The Matrix that the Matrix itself could
have produced” (McQueen, 2016, p. 6). Snide remarks aside, Baudrillard’s
work on simulation has striking resemblances to the problems facing the legit-
imate/malicious distinction discussed in the ﬁrst section of this article. In
Simulacra and Simulation, he explains the primacy of simulacra as follows:
How to feign a violation and put it to the test? Go and simulate a theft in a large
department store: how do you convince the security guards that it is a simulated
theft? There is no “objective” diﬀerence: the same gestures and the same signs
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exist as for a real theft; in fact the signs incline neither to one side nor the other.
As far as the established order is concerned, they are always of the order of the
real. (Baudrillard, 1994, p. 20)
This paragraph neatly encapsulates the dilemma of cybersecurity experts in
distinguishing between legitimate and malicious activity, faced with social
structures that permit penetration testing, bug bounties, and defensive tools
that are exactly identical to those used oﬀensively. In such a situation, Baudril-
lard argues that “the web of artiﬁcial signs will be inextricably mixed up with
real elements” (Baudrillard, 1994, p. 20). Consequently, any value orientation
towards the true or real is lost, resulting in a world devoid of moral compass,
because “hyperreality and simulation are deterrents of every principle” (Bau-
drillard, 1994, p. 21). Baudrillard’s ideas thus provide further underpinning
for the moral ambiguity and disorientation suggested by the science ﬁction,
cyber-punk and noir genres above. However, Baudrillard’s analysis is con-
ducted at too abstract a level for useful insights into the everyday practices
of cybersecurity experts. Although he claims to eschew grand narratives, a
pessimistic–and deliberatively provocative–grand narrative is exactly what
is oﬀered (Chen, 1987; Lundborg, 2016). In the next sections, I examine the
inﬂuence of noir at a more concrete level, delving in turn into the visual
styles and naming conventions of cybersecurity expert discourses.
Following Hansen’s (2006, p. 66) tripartite distinction between oﬃcial, semi-
oﬃcial (what she calls “wider foreign policy”), and popular texts, I examine
semi-oﬃcial texts produced by cybersecurity experts. The concept of expertise
plays a crucial role in cybersecurity, and cybersecurity experts range from public
cyber “gurus” to those that channel their expertise more directly, and less
overtly, towards customers and clients (Shires, 2018). Although these texts
are primarily factual reports, as Shepherd suggests, “even mechanistic, scientis-
tic accounts and ‘factual forms of knowledge’ rely on narrative form and
content” (2012, p. 3), and so the metaphors, analogies and other rhetorical
and aesthetic elements of these texts are amenable to analysis (Betz &
Stevens, 2013). However, I do not neatly divide governments from “corporate
institutions” in the manner of Hansen’s (2006, p. 61) methodology. Most cyber-
security experts have experience on both sides (and some former hackers are
experts independent of any institution), and so texts ostensibly by corporate
authors, or by dedicated cybersecurity news websites and blogs, can carry the
stylistic marks and authority of oﬃcial texts. Finally, the question of technology
requires a further qualiﬁcation. As Dunn Cavelty and Balzacq (2016) demon-
strate, technologies are also authors in cybersecurity expert discourses, as
both software and hardware are able to represent–to write–as well as be rep-
resented. The aﬀordances of these technologies shape cybersecurity expert dis-
courses in several ways, by constraining the form and circulation of reports and
by generating content of the reports themselves.
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Visual styles and images
My focus on cybersecurity images in this section follows what Bleiker (2001)
has termed “the aesthetic turn,” wherein scholars in security studies have
directed their attention to how ﬁlm, television, and photography portrayed
security themes more commonly analyzed in narrower terms of text and
speech. Although the aesthetic turn includes many of the popular culture ana-
lyses referenced so far, some scholars in critical security studies focused more
narrowly on the role of images in international politics, rather than the visual
world generally (e.g., Andersen, Vuori, & Guillaume, 2015; Heck & Schlag,
2013; Methmann, 2014). These works built on the theoretical apparatus pro-
vided by Hansen (2011, 2015), who interpreted controversial Muhammed
cartoons and Abu Ghraib photos as “icons” that embodied particular con-
ceptions of security. In this section, I argue that several aesthetic themes estab-
lished through the interaction between noir, dystopian science ﬁction, and
cyber-punk in the previous section ﬁnd their way into expert texts in cyber-
security, priming their readers to expect substantial moral ambiguity.
For cybersecurity, the ﬁrst crucial question is to what extent practices that
are, in Andersen and Möller’s (2013) terms, “at the limit of visibility” can be
incorporated into visual analyses. Due to its relative novelty and digital basis,
many concepts and objects in cybersecurity have no obvious visual associ-
ation, and so even though images are used powerfully in other security
domains to frame issues in certain ways, the scope for doing so in cybersecur-
ity is much wider. Consequently, as Hall, Heath, and Coles-Kemp (2015)
suggest, many techniques of cybersecurity visualization deserve further criti-
cal scrutiny. For example, cybersecurity expert discourses sometimes portray
their subject visually though metaphors with analogue security devices, such
as padlocks. Cybersecurity company logos, product packaging, and many soft-
ware programs use padlocks and similar devices to signal cybersecurity,
because these images signify security in the physical realm. However, such
metaphors quickly break down as these images become incorporated into
cybersecurity functions themselves. A padlock symbol on a web browser
appears automatically when the secure protocol HTTPS is used, appearing
to protect users as well as symbolizing their protection. Here, the complex
architecture of certiﬁcates and permissions behind HTTPS is reduced to a
binary choice between secure/not-secure by the presence or absence of a
padlock icon, and consequently is ignored by both experts and non-specialists
(Kelley & Bertenthal, 2015). Due to these issues, although analogue metaphors
play a role in broader cybersecurity awareness, they are not the main visual
representation of cybersecurity in expert texts.
In contrast, in many expert texts cybersecurity is visually portrayed
through a variety of symbols that simply indicate invisibility and illegibility,
such as binary or hexadecimal code. The green/blue/black aesthetic of these
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code images has a twin factual and ﬁctional genealogy. On one hand, the ﬁrst
Uniscope computer monitors, developed in the 1960s, were known as “green-
screen” terminals due to the colour of the text on their black displays,
although later models displayed white text (Brown & Workman, 1976). On
the other, landmark images of code in ﬁlms such as The Matrix drew on
this aesthetic, using cascading screens of green code to represent an entire
virtual reality. The code in contemporary cybersecurity images is indebted
to both histories, although–following Baudrillard–the distinction between
“real” and “simulated” code is not always clear. Many reports include code
from “real” cases in the main body of the text and “illustrative” code on
borders and title pages; however, in some cases this “real” code, such as
that from the 2010 Flame virus, loses its function as a set of instructions
directing the action of particular systems, and instead becomes an “illus-
tration” of generic cyberattacks (Zetter, 2012). Code images are thus multi-
valent: the same characters could clarify a technical point or illustrate an
invisible threat.
Although code images suggest some qualities of cybersecurity–namely as a
virtual, technically advanced, non-geographic “space”–cybersecurity geogra-
phies are also illustrated in a more direct sense, with a range of visualization
software representing real-time databases of cyberattacks. As scholars in con-
ventional military studies have demonstrated, spatial diagrams of conﬂict
exert a powerful inﬂuence on professional soldiers, cleansing conﬂict from
unwanted elements such as blood and fear and thereby “making war possible”
(Wasinski, 2011). In cybersecurity, “attack map” programs, made by several
prominent cybersecurity companies and often available online, are nearly
always world maps set on a dark background, with neon ﬂashes between
countries indicating malicious communications (Krebs, 2015). These maps
all look surprisingly similar, and their design is clearly indebted to noir
visual styles. Although they have been criticized for their inaccuracy and sen-
sationalism (one even makes a “pew-pew” sound imitating gunﬁre), inter-
views with their users suggests that this misses their main purpose: to
advertise to potential customers (Ragan, 2017). Again, the line between illus-
tration and demonstration is unstable. The threshold for inclusion as a data
point in an attack map is usually set low, so reconnaissance and scanning
activity appears as an “attack.” If taken literally, this is a clear misrepresenta-
tion of the threat; however, if seen as merely an indicator that cyberspace is a
world of constant threat and unidentiﬁable enemies, its level of detachment
from “reality” is a less appropriate question.
The other dominant spatial representation in expert cybersecurity dis-
courses is of cyberspace as a network, without geographic boundaries but
with nodes joined and clustered according to common attributes or other
deﬁnitions of distance (Betz & Stevens, 2013). Many cybersecurity companies
oﬀer analysis software that represents cyber threats in a network form. Some
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of these programs draw directly on noir imagery to populate “threatening”
nodes in their network maps. Both open source and proprietary versions
have their default visualization of a “threat” node as a cartoon noir character,
complete with greatcoat, trilby, and dark glasses (Haskins, 2019; OASIS Cyber
Threat Intelligence, 2019). This dark, hatted, ﬁgure operates as part of a wider
discursive constellation of threat images in cybersecurity. Hats have been part
of the cybersecurity discursive landscape since its inception, with “black hat”
and “white hat” signaling oﬀensive and defensive actions respectively, and one
of the largest cybersecurity conferences named after the former. The black/
white hat distinction as moral symbolism is commonly but erroneously
traced to 1930s Westerns (Laskow, 2017), and its moral connotations in
cybersecurity are so sedimented that a “grey hat” designation is used to ident-
ify those that conduct both oﬀensive and defensive action.
The black hat becomes a black hood in the most recognizable noir-
inﬂuenced cybersecurity visualization, the paradigmatic stock “hacker”
image (Figure 1, overlaid with green code). The hacker stock photo reportedly
ﬁrst appeared in 2008 (Know Your Meme, 2016), and images similar to Figure
1 accompany many cybersecurity texts. Such images often include a hood,
dark face, balaclava, leather gloves, and keyboard, and clearly borrow signiﬁ-
cantly from the noir visual style and palette. The discursive power of these
images in shaping expert cybersecurity discourses has been noted by IR scho-
lars (Unver, 2017), and they are seen as so detrimental to a “proper” represen-
tation of cybersecurity that inﬂuential funding bodies have commissioned
projects to ﬁnd a replacement (Sugarman & Wickline, 2019).
Figure 1. Hacker stock photo. Image credit: “hacker-1,” iaBeta © 2017, Public Domain.
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Although these images populate expert cybersecurity texts, they are
designed by commercial artists drawing on their popular conception of cyber-
security, rather than any expert knowledge. As an interview with a photogra-
pher who specializes in these photos explains:
I know nothing about hacking and never have paid any attention to the speciﬁcs
of it either. It’s pure imagination at work here, both mine and the viewer’s, who
realises the image illustrating an article is just a symbolic supplement to the text.
(Cox, 2016)
This “pure imagination” is infused with a noir aesthetic, indicating that the
hacker stock image owes more to the lineage of noir ﬁlms than technical
“speciﬁcs.” This interview also illuminates unexpected technical rationaliz-
ations for apparently noir elements; for example, black balaclavas are used
to prevent facial recognition of the photographer’s model and any automated
association with illegal activity. Although the photographer’s phrase “sym-
bolic supplement” is exactly right, he downplays its inﬂuence, claiming that
images are “just” an accompaniment to text. In fact, noir images are also
used by hackers themselves, becoming the threat that they are perceived to
be. For example, the Anonymous hacker collective uses two images: the
image of a suited ﬁgure with a question mark replacing the head, signifying
anonymity, or a mask with stylized depiction of Guy Fawkes from the noir
graphic novel and ﬁlm V for Vendetta (Coleman, 2014, p. 64).
The interaction between oﬀensive, “black hat,” cyber actors and noir visual
styles can be even more complex, as illustrated by the group “Shadow Brokers,”
known for their leak of U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) hacking tools in
2016 and 2017 and reportedly associated with the Russian state (Schneier,
2017). The Shadow Brokers themselves did not provide any prompts for
their visual persona, with their online accounts featuring only text or empty
proﬁle images. Despite this blank canvas, extensive noir imagery emerged in
reports of this group, with widespread images containing dark silhouetted
ﬁgures in overcoats and fedoras against a red background (Kumar, 2017).
Although the name “Shadow Brokers” echoes a set of characters from fantasy
game Mass Eﬀect, this reference was quickly overtaken by the noir imagery,
originally created by cybersecurity news website The Hacker News. Other
texts identiﬁed further visual connections between diﬀerent cyber threats,
with another tech news site suggesting that the Shadow Brokers’ NSA leak
“was meant to look like it was carried out by Guy-Fawkes-mask-wearing ideo-
logical warriors” (Templeton, 2016). This multi-layered description again dis-
solves neat distinctions between “real” and “simulated” threats, as it links the
Shadow Brokers to Anonymous speciﬁcally through their visual style, despite
recognizing the artiﬁce of the Shadow Brokers identity.
Finally, despite the prevalence of the classic hacker stock image and its
derivatives, these classic noir inﬂuences are not the only depictions of
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threat actors in cybersecurity. Other images connoting violence and death,
such as a skull and crossbones or devil horns (and even the devil emoji),
feature prominently in cybersecurity visual styles. As attribution capabilities
in both states and the private sector have grown, stock images have been
replaced by traditional mugshots, stills from webcams, and images from
court appearances. In particular, the threat intelligence industry has honed
its imagery, inﬂuenced by the sophisticated cartoon style of graphic novels
and ﬁlms like Sin City and Se7en. For example, Fancy Bear, the codename
for a Russian threat actor invented by cybersecurity ﬁrm Crowdstrike, is por-
trayed on all their reports with glowing red eyes and a Soviet-style fur hat
(Crowdstrike, 2019).
Overall, visual styles and images in cybersecurity expert discourses play a
key role both in constructing speciﬁc entities and in shaping the overall cyber-
security ﬁeld itself. Through code images signifying illegibility and technical
sophistication, and pseudo-geographic “attack maps” emphasizing constant
threat, cybersecurity is portrayed as a dark and uncertain world where simu-
lation slips easily into reality and reality into simulation. A range of threaten-
ing identities are created using images of noir characters, various coloured
hats, and hooded hackers. These images and visual styles use noir aesthetics
and palettes to convey transgression, danger and moral ambiguity. In the
next section, I turn from visual styles to textual representations to explore
how such morally ambiguous identities enable expert practices that embody
this transgression and liminality.
Names and practices
One of the most obvious features of cybersecurity expert discourses is that it is
full of new proper nouns. Individuals, corporations, hacking collectives, threat
actors, even speciﬁc vulnerabilities, exploits and hacking tools all have their
own pseudonyms, noms de guerre, handles and codenames. Cybersecurity
experts do not create nomenclature from nothing, and these names are
infused with popular culture, through direct references and quotations and
in their style, sound and visual aspect.
Many names evoke the crossover between noir, science ﬁction, fantasy and
cyber punk in popular culture. The UK’s counterpart to the NSA, the General
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), uses codenames that display a
range of “geeky” humor infused with science ﬁction (Hern, 2014). Such refer-
ences include graphics novels-ﬁlms such as Deadpool and X-Men, and even a
technique for obtaining the IP address of MSN messenger users called
“Photon Torpedo,” from the Star Trek weapon (The Intercept, 2014). The
U.S. government is similarly indebted to science ﬁction: the Department of
Defense (DoD) cloud migration project, started by a Defense Digital Service
team that wear hoodies and embrace counterculture, is named “JEDI”
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(Garamone, 2016), while the same team were prevented from using another
Star Wars reference because DoD seniors viewed “C3PO” as a “stupid
acronym” (Bandler, Tsui, & Burke, 2019). The names of cybersecurity compa-
nies continue this theme. A leading surveillance and data analysis company is
called Palantir, the name of the “seeing-stones” in Lord Of The Rings, while
even companies without explicit references evoke a similar atmosphere, in
words like FireEye, Crowdstrike, Crysys, and Cylance. They pass on these
connotations to their proprietary platforms: for example, Crowdstrike’s intru-
sion detection software is named Falcon, evoking not just the bird but also the
Star Wars spacecraft of the same name. Although these are clearly strategic
marketing decisions–it is easier to convince a customer of the purpose of a
Falcon than to explain the technical details of its function–they also shape
the identity of the individuals who work in these organizations and the organ-
izations themselves.
Names do not only shape identities on the defensive side of cybersecurity
expert discourses. “Threat actors”–combinations of technical signatures,
behavior patterns, and operator identities–are given codenames by every
cybersecurity company that investigates them, leading to a proliferation of
names lamented by most experts. These choices are part threat construction,
part branding, and part knowing in-jokes, and they are selected just as often
by the analysts themselves as they are chosen by marketing departments.
Speciﬁc vulnerabilities also receive names that could be straight from dysto-
pian ﬁction, like “Heartbleed,” “Spectre,” “Meltdown,” and “Rowhammer.”
Often, threat names depend on a close familiarity with the technological
objects of cybersecurity. Speciﬁc malware strings, drive and ﬁle names, and
internet protocols all make their way into names of cybersecurity threats.
Hackers and intelligence agencies also leave traces of names in the software
they write; in another scene reminiscent of Baudrillard, it is the reader’s
task to ascertain whether these are “real” names left accidentally, or if they
are a “false ﬂag” simulating the identity of another actor to distract and mis-
direct investigators (Bartholomew & Guerrero-Saade, 2016). Overall, accord-
ing to one author, cybersecurity experts:
… use fancy names and naming schemes that create an emotional, ﬁgurative or
mythological context. They shed a diﬀerent light on our work — the tedious
investigation tasks, the long working hours, the intense remediation weekends
and numerous hours of management meetings. If the adversary is Wicked
Panda, Sandworm or Hidden Cobra, we perceive ourselves as some kind of
super heroes thwarting their vicious plans. These names create an emotional
engagement. (Roth, 2018)
This emotional and ﬁgurative context is exactly the kind of discursive
interaction expected by post-structuralist approaches. Names with popular
cultural inﬂuences and narratives not only enliven the working day for cyber-
security experts, but constitute the moral orientation of their world. However,
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most cybersecurity names do not evince grand superhero narratives. Instead,
they highlight a darker aesthetic and more ambiguous moral position. For
example, in a textual incarnation of the noir palette explored in the previous
section, cybersecurity companies labelled severe vulnerabilities exploited by
U.S. intelligence agencies “Black Lambert” and “Eternal Blue,” while “Black
Energy” and “Grey Energy” are well-known Russian-attributed cyber-
attacks. The company names quoted in the introduction also exhibit this pre-
ference for noir-inﬂected colours. Although light and dark shades are classi-
cally associated with good and evil, in cybersecurity–as in noir–both “good”
and “bad” entities occupy the same place in the visual spectrum. Names
thus oﬀer no indication of moral position, deliberately collapsing the fragile
distinction between legitimate and malicious activity.
Some names refer more directly to practices that blur the boundary
between legitimate and malicious activity, such as the cybersecurity
company [redacted]. [redacted] is run by a former Facebook and NSA
employee, who “describes himself as a specialist in ‘hacking,’ ‘breaking
stuﬀ,’ and ‘doing impossible things’” (Schmidle, 2018). The choice of
[redacted] as the name for this cybersecurity company discreetly emphasizes
the founder’s intelligence background by mimicking national security redac-
tions from oﬃcial documents. But the echoes travel further and become more
distorted as they do so: in a postmodern ﬂourish, the company advertises its
lack of a name by making its erasure especially prominent. Consequently,
[redacted] not only implies secrecy but also (in an entirely transparent
manner) invisibility, suggesting that a company with no name has more lati-
tude to engage in hacking–as its founder does–than one which follows the tra-
ditional corporate conﬁnes of a capitalized proper noun. A less subtle example
from the same text also points towards transgressive practices. Rendition
Infosec, also run by a former NSA employee, refers to one of the most con-
troversial practices of the U.S. War on Terror. Although Rendition Infosec
and similar companies reportedly “dance at the limits of computer trespassing
every single day of the week” (Schmidle, 2018), rather than transport detai-
nees for torture and interrogation, their deliberate reference to extraordinary
rendition signals their willingness to go beyond mere defensive protection for
their clients.
More established ﬁgures in the cybersecurity industry also combine noir-
inﬂuenced identities with acceptance of transgressive practices. In his testi-
mony to the House of Representatives sub-committee on cybersecurity in
2013, Kevin Mandia, a cybersecurity CEO and former U.S. government
oﬃcial, emphasized that “cyber remains the one area where if there is a
dead body on the ground, there is no police you call who will run to you
and do the forensics and all that” (Committee on Homeland Security, 2013,
p. 41). This was of course a metaphor, as there was no literal dead body in
the Chinese cyber-espionage cases his company were known for. Nonetheless,
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he portrayed his role exactly like the start of a ﬁlm noir: an absent police pres-
ence, a violent act and a dead body, and a self-reliant private investigator. In
other contexts, Mandia indicates an acceptance of and justiﬁcation for trans-
gressive action. Commenting on the creation of U.S. Cyber Command in
2018, he suggested that “my gut, just pure gut, not fact based — [U.S.
Cyber Command] will probably break the niceties… in cyberspace, everyone
else is breaking [laws]” (Shoorbajee, 2018). For Mandia, a cyber-noir identity
involves public legitimization of oﬀensive practices that break the law–dis-
missed as “niceties”–and a “gut” instinct that transgression is pervasive
throughout cybersecurity.
Even companies and organizations that do not openly comment on trans-
gressive practices seek to portray themselves as having the potential to engage
in them. The name of the largest bug bounty program, HackerOne, explicitly
attempts to retain the hacker glamour explored in the previous section while
requiring a strictly contractual structure for its participants. Another example
is of a U.S.-based cybersecurity company with an oﬃce located next to a laun-
derette. When I visited this company, I drew a parallel with the ﬁctional oﬃce
of a spy agency in the cartoonArcher, which draws heavily on noir, with visual
styles and character similarities–and sometimes exact plot duplication–refer-
encing the noir canon. My guide, an employee at the company, explained that
they were well aware of this similarity, and that when they renovated the oﬃce
they had requested that the launderette sign remain as an Archer reference,
despite closing the launderette. Although this company does not publicly
claim to “hack back,” it does engage in several forms of undercover infor-
mation gathering, and so the employees saw the morally ambiguous Archer
location as an appropriate site for their work.
For some cybersecurity experts, noir inﬂuences have severe consequences.
In 2017, British youth Marcus Hutchins became well-known among cyberse-
curity experts, following his portrayal as the person who singlehandedly
stopped the devastating WannaCry virus that aﬀected the UK’s National
Health Service. He used a simple domain registration tool to do so, re-regis-
tering the command and control domain and so nullifying the malware. For
some experts, even this is considered a form of “hacking back” and therefore
transgressive (x0rz, 2017). However, Hutchins’ fame enabled other cyberse-
curity experts and U.S. law enforcement to follow a trail of domain names,
malware names, and handles on hacker forums, including “ghosthosting,”
“hackblack,” “blackshades,” and “blackhole,” to the creation of an illegal
banking virus named Kronos (Krebs, 2017). Hutchins was arrested months
after his public appearance and sentenced to time served in July 2019 for
his role in distributing this virus (Whittaker, 2019). As such, his switch
between black and white hat – including noir preferences in naming
conventions - earned him notoriety as well as fame. Hutchins’ case is thus
the epitome of the co-constitution between noir aesthetics and transgressive
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practices explored in this section. As his story illustrates, cybersecurity expert
identities are constituted in part through noir references and aesthetics that
make hacking back, undercover intelligence collection and participation in
“grey” or “black” hacking forums a normal, even necessary, set of activities.
Furthermore, noir aesthetics destabilize not only the moral orientation of
cybersecurity experts, but even the claim of the ﬁeld to unproblematic
factual knowledge, as both attackers and defenders draw on noir inﬂuences
to mimic each other in unending layers of simulation and artiﬁce.
Conclusion
The cybersecurity story sees the internet as an environment of persistent
threat and potential disaster despite its early hopes; in Chandler’s terms,
cyberspace is “a world gone wrong” (as cited in Luhr, 2012, p. 15). Severe
cybersecurity vulnerabilities result from systemic technological, economic
or social deﬁciencies, including distorted incentives for protection on one
hand and black markets for stolen information or new exploits on the
other. Into this world enters the cybersecurity expert, with the glamour of a
spy and the unconventional smarts and independence of a private eye,
“relying on their intelligence, intuition, and sheer nerve” (Luhr, 2012).
Whether recruited from intelligence agencies or harboring a hacker past,
the cybersecurity expert represents both transgression and redemption. He
(usually male) switches between legitimate and malicious activity at a whim.
I have argued in this article that the fragile distinction between legitimate
and malicious activity in cybersecurity expert discourses is not merely a ques-
tion of technological similarities, exacerbated by particular economic and
institutional structures. Instead, expert identities themselves perpetuate uncer-
tainty over what is legitimate and malicious in cybersecurity. These expert
identities are constituted through visual and textual inﬂuences from
broader discourses of noir in popular culture, including dystopian science
ﬁction, fantasy, and cyber-punk. This identity construction adds to the expli-
cit obstacles confronting cybersecurity experts, suggesting that the task of sep-
arating legitimate and malicious is much more challenging than commonly
thought. Although cybersecurity experts seek to identify and prevent mali-
cious threats while preserving legitimate activity, the popular cultural
aspects of their practices simultaneously collapse this distinction, undermin-
ing their apparent goal.
This analysis has several limitations. Theoretically, it used the meta-step of
analyzing cybersecurity in terms of a popular culture analytical category
(noir), rather than tracing the inﬂuence of speciﬁc ﬁlms or popular culture
artefacts. A more detailed study could delineate the way speciﬁc artefacts
appear in cybersecurity discourses and practices. The empirical data could
also be increased through both qualitative and quantitative means.
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Quantitatively, a larger set of images would provide more robust evidence for
the inﬂuence of noir visual styles, while qualitatively, a more systematic dis-
course analysis of a tightly delineated set of texts could be supplemented by
an extended ethnography or interviews.
Other limitations suggest further avenues for research. The article focuses
on the United States and United Kingdom as the site for cyber-noir inﬂuences.
However, following Smolin’s tracing of the emergence of “Moroccan noir” in
media representations of the Moroccan police (Smolin, 2013), we cannot
assume that this would be the same in all world regions, and so the extent
to which this analysis can be generalized remains open. Also, this article
has set aside the gendered aspects of noir, despite extensive research in ﬁlm
studies on questions such as sexism, misogyny, and space for feminist criti-
cism in the noir canon. Given the gender imbalances of the cybersecurity pro-
fession, one of the further contributions of cyber-noir might be to investigate
conceptions of masculinity and femininity in cybersecurity beyond a question
of sheer numbers.
If noir accurately captures the cybersecurity worldview, then what next? To
return to Weber’s (2005) deﬁnition of moral grammars as “codes or contexts
(or both) about the good and the bad that structure narratives of interpret-
ation” (p. 5), reading the moral grammars of noir into expert cybersecurity
practices suggests that there is no easy solution. Despite noir’s darker
elements, a more conventional Hollywood narrative, triumphing over evil
and rejoicing in the ﬁnal scenes, also seems regressive given the range of nar-
rative possibilities opened by noir. Instead, perhaps cyber-noir can remain a
major theme of cybersecurity visual styles and professional practices, but tem-
pered by a recognition that noir itself is ﬁction; and so too, to some extent, is
cybersecurity. The violence, catastrophe and glamour of cybersecurity is exag-
gerated, and deliberately so; cybersecurity experts both consciously and sub-
consciously dissolve borders between fact and ﬁction, simulation and reality;
and the noir elements of cybersecurity provide entertainment for experts, pro-
viding not only deeper meaning but also fun and enjoyment. Consequently,
just as noir parodies emerged shortly after the beginning of noir itself, so
expert cybersecurity discourses could be read not straight-faced, as signs of
impending doom, but less seriously as ironic nods to wider popular culture.
In short, rather than telling a diﬀerent cybersecurity story, we can tell this
cybersecurity story diﬀerently.
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